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A Weak Dynamic Programming Principle for Zero-Sum
Stochastic Differential Games with Unbounded Controls
Erhan Bayraktar∗† , Song Yao‡
Abstract
We analyze a zero-sum stochastic differential game between two competing players who can choose unbounded
controls. The payoffs of the game are defined through backward stochastic differential equations. We prove that
each player’s priority value satisfies a weak dynamic programming principle and thus solves the associated fully
non-linear partial differential equation in the viscosity sense.
Keywords: Zero-sum stochastic differential games, Elliott-Kalton strategies, weak dynamic programming
principle, backward stochastic differential equations, viscosity solutions, fully non-linear PDEs.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we extend the study of Buckdahn and Li [11] on a zero-sum stochastic differential game (SDG), whose
payoffs are generated by backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs), to the case of super-square-integrable
controls (see Remark 2.1).
Since the seminal paper by Fleming and Souganidis [16], the SDG theory has grown rapidly in many aspects
(see e.g. the references in [11], [10]). Among these developments, Hamade`ne et al. [18, 19, 14] introduced a
(decoupled) SDE-BSDE system, with controls only in the drift coefficients, to generate the payoffs in their studies
of saddle point problems of SDGs. (For the evolution and applications of the BSDE theory, see Pardoux and Peng
[27], El Karoui et al. [15] and the references therein.) Later on, [11] as well as its sequels [13, 12, 10] generalized
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the SDE-BSDE framework so that the two competing controllers can also influence the diffusion coefficient of the
state dynamics. Unlike [16], [11] used a uniform canonical space Ω =
{
ω ∈ C([0, T ];Rd) : ω(0) = 0
}
so that
admissible control processes can also depend on the information occurring before the start of the game. Such a
setting allows the authors of [11] get around a relatively complicated approximation argument of [16] which was due
to a measurability issue (see Remark 2.5), and allows them to adopt the notion of stochastic backward semigroups
and a BSDE method, developed in [28, 30], to obtain results similar to [16]: the lower and upper values of the SDG
satisfy a dynamic programming principle and solve the associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equations in the
viscosity sense. However, [11], [16] as well as some latest advances to the SDG theory (e.g. Bouchard et al. [6] on
stochastic target games, Peng and Xu [29] on SDGs in form of a generalized BSDE with random default time) still
assume the compactness of control spaces while Pham and Zhang [32] on weak formulation of SDGs assumes the
boundedness of coefficients in control variables. We are going to address these particular issues.
In the present paper, since two players take super-square-integrable admissible controls over two separable metric
spaces U and V not necessarily compact, those approximation methods of [16] and [11] in proving the dynamic
programming principle are no longer effective. Instead, we derive a weak form of dynamic programming principle
in spirit of Bouchard and Touzi [7] and use it to show that each player’s priority value solves the corresponding
fully non-linear PDE in the viscosity sense. Vitoria [33] has tried to extend the SDG for unbounded controls by
proving a weak dynamic programming principle. However, it still assumed that the control space of the player with
priority is compact, see Theorem 75 therein.
Square-integrable controls were initially considered by Krylov [22, Chapter 6], however, for cooperative games
(i.e. the so called sup sup case). Browne [9] studied a specific zero-sum investment game between two small investors
who control the game via their square-integrable portfolios. Since the PDEs in this case have smooth solutions, the
problem can be solved by a verification theorem instead of the dynamic programming principle. Inspired by the
“tug-of-war” (a discrete-time random turn game, see e.g. [31] and [25]), Atar and Budhiraja [1] studied a zero-sum
stochastic differential game with U = V = {x ∈ Rn : |x| = 1} × [0,∞) played until the state process exits a given
domain. As in Chapter 6 of [22], the authors approximated such a game with unbounded controls by a sequence
of games with bounded controls which satisfy a dynamic programming principle. They showed the equicontinuity
of the approximating sequence and thus proved that the value function of the game is a unique viscosity solution
to the inhomogenous infinity Laplace equation. We do not rely on this approximation scheme but directly prove a
weak dynamic programming principle for the game with super-square-integrable controls.
Following the probabilistic setting of [11] (see Remark 2.5), our paper takes the canonical space Ω =
{
ω ∈
C([0, T ];Rd) : ω(0) = 0
}
, whose coordinator process B is a Brownian motion under the Wiener measure P . When
the game starts from time t ∈ [0, T ], under the super-square-integrable controls µ ∈ Ut and ν ∈ Vt selected by player
I and II respectively, the state process Xt,ξ,µ,ν starting from a random initial state ξ will then evolve according to
a stochastic differential equation (SDE):














dBr, s ∈ [t, T ], (1.1)
where the drift b and the diffusion σ are Lipschitz continuous in x and have linear growth in (u, v). The payoff
player I will receive from player II is determined by the first component of the unique solution
(
Y t,ξ,µ,ν , Zt,ξ,µ,ν
)















ZrdBr, s ∈ [t, T ]. (1.2)
Here the generator f is Lipschitz continuous in (y, z) and also has linear growth in (u, v). When g and f are
2/p−Ho¨lder continuous in x for some p ∈ (1, 2], Y t,ξ,µ,ν is p−integrable. As we see from (1.1) and (1.2) that the
controls µ, ν influence the game in two aspects: both affect (1.2) via the state process Xt,ξ,µ,ν and appear directly
in the generator f of (1.2) as parameters. In particular, if f is independent of (y, z), Y is in form of the conditional




plus the cumulative reward
∫ T
s
f(r,Xt,ξ,µ,νr , µr, νr) dr (cf. [16]).
When the player (e.g. Player I) with the priority chooses firstly a super-square-integrable control (e.g. µ ∈ Ut),
its opponent (e.g. Player II) will select its reacting control via a non-anticipative mapping β : Ut → Vt, called Elliott-
Kalton strategy. In particular, using Elliott-Kalton strategies is essential in proving the dynamic programming
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principle. This phenomenon already appears in the controller-stopper games, i.e. when one of the players is
endowed with the right of stopping the game instead of using a control; see [2], which shows that if the stopper acts
second it is necessary that the stopper uses non-anticipative strategies in order to prove a dynamic programming
principle. This type of phenomenon does not appear (or it is implicitly satisfied) if the controllers only control the
drift, see e.g. [3] and the references therein, or when there are two stoppers (the so-called Dynkin games), see e.g.









t we denote Player I’s priority value of the game starting from time t and
state x, where Bt collects all admissible strategies for Player II. Switching the priority defines Player II’s priority
value w2(t, x).
Although our setting makes the payoffs Y t,ξ,µ,νt random variables, we can show like [11] that w1(t, x) and
w2(t, x) are invariant under Girsanov transformation via functions of the Cameron-Martin space and are thus
deterministic, see Lemma 2.2. To assure values w1(t, x) and w2(t, x) are finite, we assume that each player has
some control neutralizer for coefficients (b, σ, f) (such an assumption holds for additive controls, see Example 2.1),
and we impose a growth condition on strategies. These two requirements are also crucial in proving our weak
dynamic programming principle. When U and V are compact, the control neutralizers become futile and the
growth condition holds automatically for strategies. Thus our problem degenerates to [11]’s case, see Remark 2.4.
Although value functions w1(t, x), w2(t, x) are still 2/p−Ho¨lder continuous in x (see Proposition 2.3), they may
not be continuous in t. Hence we can not follow [11]’s approach to get a strong form of dynamic programming






























for any two continuous functions φ ≤ w1 ≤ φ˜. Here τβ,µ denotes the first existing time of state process Xt,x,µ,β(µ)
from the given open ball Oδ(t, x).
To prove the weak dynamic programming principle, we first approximate w1(t, x) = essinf
β∈Bt
I(t, x, β) from above






t from below in a probabilistic sense (see Lemma 4.2) so that we can construct
approximately optimal controls/strategies by a pasting technique similar to the one used in [7] and [33]. Then we
make a series of estimates and eventually obtain the weak dynamic programming principle by using a stochastic
backward semigroup property (2.11), the continuous dependence of payoff process on the initial state (see Lemma
2.3) as well as the control-neutralizer assumption and the growth condition on strategies.
Next, one can deduce from the weak dynamic programming principle and the separability of control space U,
V that the value functions w1 and w2 are (discontinuous) viscosity solutions of the corresponding fully non-linear
PDEs, see Theorem 3.1. Recently, Krylov [24] and [23] studied the regularity of solutions to related fully non-
linear PDEs: The former obtained C1,1 ∩W 1,2∞,loc−solutions for the case of bounded measurable coefficients; while
the latter showed the existence of Lp−viscosity solutions in C1+α if the fully non-linear Hamiltonian function is
continuous in gradient variable and Lipschitz continuous in Hessian variable.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: After listing the notations to use, we recall some basic properties of
BSDEs in Section 1. In Section 2, we set up the zero-sum stochastic differential games based on BSDEs and present
a weak dynamic programming principle for priority values of both players defined via Elliott-Kalton strategies. With
help of the weak dynamic programming principle, we show in Section 3 that the priority values are (discontinuous)
viscosity solutions of the corresponding fully non-linear PDEs. The proofs of our results are deferred to Section 4.
1.1 Notation and Preliminaries
Let (M, ρ
M
) be a generic metric space and let B(M) be the Borel σ−field of M. For any x ∈ M and δ > 0,
Oδ(x)
△
={x′ ∈M : ρ
M
(x, x′) < δ} and Oδ(x)
△
={x′ ∈ M : ρ
M
(x, x′) ≤ δ} respectively denote the open and closed ball
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where lim
n→∞↓ (resp. limn→∞↑ ) denotes the limit of a decreasing (resp. increasing) sequence.




ω ∈C([0, T ];Rd) : ω(0) = 0
}
equipped with Wiener measure P , under which the canonical process B is a d−dimensional Brownian motion.
Let F = {Ft}t∈[0,T ] be the filtration generated by B and augmented by all P−null sets. We denote by P the
F−progressively measurable σ−field of [0, T ]× Ω.
Given t ∈ [0, T ], Let St,T collect all F−stopping times τ with t ≤ τ ≤ T , P−a.s. For any τ ∈ St,T and A ∈ Fτ ,




(r, ω) ∈ [t, T ]× A : r < τ(ω)
}




(r, ω) ∈ [t, T ]× A : r ≥ τ(ω)
}
for any A ∈ Fτ .
In particular, [[t, τ [[
△
= [[t, τ [[Ω and [[τ, T ]]
△
= [[τ, T ]]Ω are the stochastic intervals.
Let E be a generic Euclidian space. For any p ∈ [1,∞) and t ∈ [0, T ], we introduce some spaces of functions:





























([t, T ],E) denotes the space of all E−valued, F−progressively measurable processes {Xs}s∈[t,T ] such that∫ T
t |Xs|
p ds < ∞, P−a.s. For any p̂ ∈ [1,∞), Hp,p̂
F
([t, T ],E) denotes the space of all E−valued, F−progressively





















If E = R, we will drop it from the above notations. Moreover, we will use the convention inf ∅ =∞.
1.2 Backward Stochastic Differential Equations








and a function f : [t, T ]×Ω×




is called a (t, p)−parameter set









for some t ∈ [0, T ], a pair (Y, Z) ∈ C0
F
([t, T ])× H2,loc
F
([t, T ],Rd)
is called a solution of the backward stochastic differential equation on the probability space (Ω,FT , P ) over period












f(r, Yr, Zr) dr−
∫ T
s
ZrdBr, s ∈ [t, T ]. (1.3)
Analogous to Theorem 4.2 of [8], we have the following well-posedness result of BSDE (1.3).




be a (t, p)−parameter set such that f is Lipschitz
















∣∣∣Ft] ≤ C(T, p, γ)E[ |η|p + (∫ T
t
∣∣f(s, 0, 0)∣∣ds)p∣∣∣∣Ft], P−a.s. (1.4)
Also, we have the following a priori estimate and comparison results for BSDE (1.3).
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, i = 1, 2 be two (t, p)−parameter sets such that f1 is











(1 ) If E
[(∫ T
t





∣∣Y 1s −Y 2s ∣∣p˜∣∣∣∣Ft]≤C(T, p˜, γ)E[∣∣η1−η2∣∣p˜+(∫ T
t
∣∣f1(s, Y 2s , Z2s )−f2(s, Y 2s , Z2s )∣∣ds)p˜∣∣∣∣Ft]. (1.5)
(2 ) If η1 ≤ (resp. ≥) η2, P−a.s. and if f1(s, Y 2s , Z
2




s ), ds× dP−a.s. on [t, T ]× Ω, then it
holds P−a.s. that Y 1s ≤ (resp. ≥)Y
2
s for any s ∈ [t, T ].




) and (V, ρ
V










(v, v0), ∀ v ∈ V.
We shall study a zero-sum stochastic differential game between two players, player I and player II, who choose
super-square-integrable U−valued controls and V−valued controls respectively to compete:
Definition 2.1. Given t ∈ [0, T ], an admissible control process µ = {µs}s∈[t,T ] for player I over period [t, T ] is





ds < ∞ for some q > 2. Admissible control
processes for player II over period [t, T ] are defined similarly. We denote by Ut (resp. Vt) the set of all admissible
controls for player I (resp. II ) over period [t, T ].
Remark 2.1. The reason why we use super-square-integrable controls lies in the fact that in the proof of Proposition
2.2, the set of U−valued (resp.V−valued) square integrable processes is not closed under Girsanov transformation
via functions of the Cameron-Martin space (see in particular (4.17)).
Clearly, connecting two Ut−controls along some τ ∈ St,T results in a new Ut−control:
Lemma 2.1. Let t ∈ [0, T ] and τ ∈ St,T . For any µ




s, s ∈ [t, T ] defines a




s , s ∈ [t, T ] defines a Vt−control.
2.1 Game Setting: A Controlled SDE−BSDE System
Our zero-sum stochastic differential game is formulated via a (decoupled) SDE−BSDE system with the following
parameters: Fix k ∈ N, γ > 0 and p ∈ (1, 2].
1) Let b : [0, T ]×Rk ×U×V→ Rk be a B([0, T ])⊗B(Rk)⊗B(U)⊗B(V)/B(Rk)−measurable function and let
σ : [0, T ]×Rk ×U×V→ Rk×d be a B([0, T ])⊗B(Rk)⊗B(U)⊗B(V)/B(Rk×d)−measurable function such that
for any (t, u, v)∈ [0, T ]×U×V and x, x′ ∈ Rk








and |b(t, x, u, v)−b(t, x′, u, v)|+ |σ(t, x, u, v)−σ(t, x′, u, v)|≤γ|x− x′|. (2.2)
2) Let g : Rk→R be a 2/p−Ho¨lder continuous function with coefficient γ.
3) Let f : [0, T ]×Rk×R×Rd×U×V→ R be B([0, T ])⊗B(Rk)⊗B(R)⊗B(Rd)⊗B(U)⊗B(V)/B(R)−measurable
function such that for any (t, u, v) ∈ [0, T ]× U× V and any (x, y, z), (x′, y′, z′) ∈ Rk × R× Rd











∣∣f(t, x, y, z, u, v)− f(t, x′, y′, z′, u, v)∣∣ ≤ γ(|x− x′|2/p + |y − y′|+ |z − z′|). (2.4)
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For any λ ≥ 0, we let cλ denote a generic constant, depending on λ, T , γ, p and |g(0)|, whose form may vary
from line to line. (In particular, c0 stands for a generic constant depending on T , γ, p and |g(0)|.)
Also, we would like to introduce two control neutralizers ψ, ψ˜ for the coefficients: For some κ > 0









and satisfies: for any (t, x, y, z)∈ [0, T ]×Rk×R×Rd and u, u′ ∈ U\Oκ(u0)
b
(





































and satisfies: for any (t, x, y, z)∈ [0, T ]×Rk×R×Rd and v, v′ ∈ V\Oκ(v0)
b
(




























A typical example satisfying both (A-u) and (A-v) is the additive-control case:
Example 2.1. Let U = V = Rℓ and consider the following coefficients:
b(t, x, u, v)=b
(
t, x, u + v
)
, σ(t, x, u, v)=σ
(
t, x, u+ v
)
and
f(t, x, y, z, u, v)=f
(
t, x, y, z, u+ v
)
, ∀ (t, x, y, z, u, v) ∈ [0, T ]×Rk×R×Rd×U×V.
Then (A-u) and (A-v) hold for functions ψ(u) = −u and ψ˜(v) = −v respectively.
Here is another example:
Example 2.2. Given γ > 0, let b0, σ0 : [0, T ]× R→ R be two B([0, T ])⊗B(R)/B(R)−measurable functions and
let f0 : [0, T ]×R×R×R→ R be B([0, T ])⊗B(R)⊗B(R)⊗B(R)/B(R)−measurable function such that for any
t∈ [0, T ] and (x, y, z), (x′, y′, z′) ∈ R× R× R
|b0(t, x)−b0(t, x
′)|+ |σ0(t, x)−σ0(t, x′)|+
∣∣f0(t, x, y, z)− f0(t, x′, y′, z′)∣∣≤γ(|x− x′|+ |y − y′|+ |z − z′|).
Also, let U = V = R, κ > 0 and ϕ : [0, T ]× U × V → R be a jointly continuous function such that ϕ is Lipschitz
continuous in (u, v) with coefficient γ, sup
t∈[0,T ]
|ϕ(t, 0, 0)| ≤ γ, and for any (t, u, v)∈ [0, T ]×U×V
inf
|v′|≤κ|u|
ϕ(t, u, v′) ≤ 0 ≤ sup
|v′|≤κ|u|
ϕ(t, u, v′) and inf
|u′|≤κ|v|
ϕ(t, u′, v) ≤ 0 ≤ sup
|u′|≤κ|v|
ϕ(t, u′, v). (2.5)
Then b(t, x, u, v)
△
= b0(t, x) + ϕ(t, u, v), σ(t, x, u, v)
△
= σ0(t, x) + ϕ(t, u, v) and f(t, x, y, z, u, v)
△
= f0(t, x, y, z) +
ϕ(t, u, v), ∀ (t, x, y, z, u, v) ∈ [0, T ]× R × R × R × U × V are the measurable functions satisfying (2.1)−(2.4) with
k = d = 1 and p = 2. We will show at the beginning of Subsection 4.2 that (A-u) and (A-v) hold for these
coefficients.
When the game begins at time t ∈ [0, T ], player I and player II select admissible controls µ ∈ Ut and ν ∈ Vt










s, x, µs(ω), νs(ω)
)
, ∀ (s, ω, x)∈ [t, T ]×Ω×Rk





s, x, µs(ω), νs(ω)
)
, ∀ (s, ω, x)∈ [t, T ]×Ω×Rk
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is P ⊗B(Rk)/B(Rk×d)−measurable. Also, (2.2), (2.1) and Ho¨lder’s inequality show that bµ,ν , σµ,ν are Lipschitz




∣∣bµ,ν(s, 0)∣∣ ds)2 + (∫ T
t















s∈[t,T ] ∈ C
2
F





































Given s∈ [t, T ], let [µ]s denote the restriction of µ over period [s, T ] : i.e., [µ]sr
△




















































r∈[s,T ] ∈ C
2
F










r , ∀ r ∈ [s, T ]. (2.7)
Moreover, the state process depends on controls in the following way:
Lemma 2.2. Given t ∈ [0, T ], let ξ ∈ L2(Ft,R






















τ∧s , ∀ s ∈ [t, T ]. (2.8)
Now, let Θ stand for the quadruplet (t, ξ, µ, ν). Given τ ∈ St,T , the measurability of (f,XΘ, µ, ν) and (2.4)
imply that




s,XΘs (ω), y, z, µs(ω), νs(ω)
)
, ∀ (s, ω, y, z) ∈ [t, T ]× Ω× R× Rd
is a P ⊗B(R)⊗B(Rd)/B(R)−measurable function that is Lipschitz continuous in (y, z) with coefficient γ. And



















Thus, for any η ∈ Lp(Fτ ), Proposition 1.1 shows that the BSDE(t, η, fΘτ ) admits a unique solution
(







, which has the following estimate as a consequence of (1.5).






∣∣∣Y t,ξ,µ,νs (τ, η1)− Y t,ξ,µ,νs (τ, η2)∣∣∣p˜∣∣∣∣Ft] ≤ cp˜E[|η1 − η2|p˜∣∣Ft], P−a.s. (2.10)
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. To wit, we have(
Y Θs
(












, s ∈ [t, T ]. (2.11)
In particular, when ζ = τ ,(










, s ∈ [t, T ]. (2.12)







, we can deduce from (2.7) that{(






































Zr′dBr′ , r ∈ [s, T ].
Hence, it holds P−a.s. that
Y Θr (τ, η) = Y
Θs
r (τ, η), ∀ r ∈ [s, T ]. (2.13)












From (1.5) and the standard estimate of SDE (1.1), we can deduce the following a priori estimate:





∣∣∣Y t,ξ1,µ,νs (T, g(Xt,ξ1,µ,νT ))− Y t,ξ2,µ,νs (T, g(Xt,ξ2,µ,νT ))∣∣∣p˜∣∣∣∣Ft] ≤ cp˜|ξ1−ξ2| 2p˜p , P−a.s. (2.14)
2.2 Definition of the Value Functions and a Weak Dynamic Programming Principle
Now, we are ready to introduce values of the zero-sum stochastic differential games via the following version of
Elliott−Kalton strategies (or non-anticipative strategies).
Definition 2.2. Given t∈ [0, T ], an admissible strategy α for player I over period [t, T ] is a mapping α : Vt→Ut







≤κ+Cα[νs]V, ds×dP−a.s., where κ is the
constant that appears in (A-u) and (A-v); (ii) For any ν1, ν2∈Vt, τ ∈St,T and A∈Fτ , if ν1= ν2, ds×dP−a.s.
on [[t, τ [[∪ [[τ, T ]]A, then α(ν1)=α(ν2), ds×dP−a.s. on [[t, τ [[∪ [[τ, T ]]A.
Admissible strategies β : Ut → Vt for player II over period [t, T ] are defined similarly. The collection of all





Remark 2.2. The condition (ii) of Definition 2.2 is called the nonanticipativity of strategies. It is said in [11,






j), · · · ”. What actually
used in this equality is not the nonanticipativity of β2 as defined in Definition 3.2 therein, but the requirement:
For any u, u˜∈Ut+δ,T and A∈Ft+δ, if u= u˜ on [t+ δ, T ]×A, then β2(u)=β2(u˜) on [t+δ, T ]×A. (2.15)
Since β2 is a restriction of strategy β ∈ Bt,T over period [t+δ, T ], (2.15) entails the following condition on β.


















which is exactly a simple version of our nonanticipativity condition on strategies with τ = s.
2.2 Definition of the Value Functions and a Weak Dynamic Programming Principle 9

















































as player I’s and player II’s priority values of the zero-sum stochastic differential game that starts from time t with
initial state x.











































s,Xt,x,α(ν),νs , (α(ν))s, νs
)
ds
∣∣∣∣Ft], ∀ (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rk.
Remark 2.4. When U and V are compact (say U = Oκ(u0) and V = Oκ(v0)), Assumptions (A-u), (A-v) are no
longer needed, and the integrability condition in Definition 2.1 as well as the condition (i) in Definition 2.2 hold
automatically. Thus our game problem degenerates to the case of [11].
Let us review some basic properties of the essential extrema for the later use
(
see e.g. [26, Proposition VI-1-1]
or [17, Theorem A.32]
)
:
Lemma 2.4. Let {ξi}i∈I , {ηi}i∈I be two classes of FT−measurable random variables with the same index set I.
(1) If ξi ≤ (=) ηi, P−a.s. holds for all i ∈ I, then esssup
i∈I
ξi ≤ (=) esssup
i∈I
ηi, P−a.s.


















(3) For any FT−measurable random variable η and any λ > 0, we have esssup
i∈I
(λξi + η) = λ esssup
i∈I
ξi + η, P−a.s.





The values w1, w2 are bounded as follows:
Proposition 2.1. For any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rk, it holds P−a.s. that |w1(t, x)|+ |w2(t, x)| ≤ cκ + c0|x|2/p.
Similar to Proposition 3.1 of [11], the following result allows us to regard w1 and w2 as deterministic functions
on [0, T ]× Rk:
Proposition 2.2. Let i = 1, 2. For any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rk, it holds P−a.s. that wi(t, x) = E[wi(t, x)].
Moreover, as a consequence of (2.14), w1 and w2 are 2/p−Ho¨lder continuous in x:
Proposition 2.3. For any t ∈ [0, T ] and x1, x2 ∈ Rk,
∣∣w1(t, x1)−w1(t, x2)∣∣+ ∣∣w2(t, x1)−w2(t, x2)∣∣ ≤ c0|x1−x2|2/p.
However, the values w1, w2 are generally not continuous in t unless U, V are compact.
Remark 2.5. When trying to directly prove the dynamic programming principle, [16] encountered a measurability
issue: The pasted strategies for approximation may not be progressively measurable, see page 299 therein. So they
first proved that the value functions are unique viscosity solutions to the associated Bellman-Isaacs equations by a
time-discretization approach (assuming that the limiting Isaacs equation has a comparison principle), which relies
on the following regularity of the approximating values vπ
|vπ(t, x) − vπ(t
′, x′)| ≤ C
(
|t− t′|1/2 + |x− x′|
)
, ∀ (t, x), (t′, x′) ∈ [0, T ]× Rk
with a uniform coefficient C > 0 for all partitions π of [0, T ]. Since our value functions w1, w2 may not be
1/2−Ho¨lder continuous in t, this method seems not suitable for our problem. Hence, we adopt Buckdahn and Li’s
probability setting.
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The following weak dynamic programming principle for value functions w1, w2 is the main result of the paper:
Theorem 2.1. 1 ) Given t ∈ [0, T ), let φ, φ˜ : [t, T ]×Rk → R be two continuous functions such that φ(s, x) ≤











































2 ) Given t ∈ [0, T ), let φ, φ˜ : [t, T ] × Rk → R be two continuous functions such that φ(s, x) ≤ w2(s, x) ≤ φ˜(s, x),











































The significance of such a weak dynamic programming principle lies in the following fact: Since wi, i = 1, 2 may
















and thus the strong dynamic programming principle may not be well-defined.
3 Viscosity Solutions of Related Fully Non-linear PDEs
In this section, we show that the priority values are (discontinuous) viscosity solutions to the following partial










=0, ∀ (t, x)∈(0, T )×Rk. (3.1)
Definition 3.1. Let us denote by Sk the set of all R
k×k−valued symmetric matrices and let H: [0, T ]×Rk×R×Rk×
Sk→ [−∞,∞]. An upper (resp. lower) semicontinuous function w : [0, T ]×Rk→R is called a viscosity subsolution




such that w−ϕ attains a strict











For any (t, x, y, z,Γ, u, v)∈ [0, T ]×Rk×R×Rd×Sk×U×V, set







σσT (t, x, u, v) Γ
)
+ z · b(t, x, u, v) + f
(
t, x, y, z · σ(t, x, u, v), u, v
)
.















































v ∈ V : [v]
V







u ∈ U : [u]
U












Onv = 1{v=v0}Oκ(u0) + 1{v 6=v0}U.
Remark 3.1. When U and V are compact (say U = Oκ(u0) and V = Oκ(v0)), it holds for any (u, v) ∈ U × V






= (V,U). If further assuming as [11] that for any (x, y, z) ∈ Rk × R × Rd, b(·, x, ·, ·),
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σ(·, x, ·, ·),f(·, x, y, z, ·, ·) are all continuous in (t, u, v), one can deduce from (2.1)−(2.4) that the continuity of


















































H(Ξ, u, v) = H1(Ξ).






















′, x′), ∀ (t, x)∈ [0, T ]×Rk.
In fact, wi is the largest lower semicontinuous function below wi (known as the lower semicontinuous envelope of
wi) while wi is the smallest upper semicontinuous function above wi (known as the upper semicontinuous envelope
of wi).
Theorem 3.1. For i = 1, 2, wi (resp. wi) is a viscosity supersolution (resp. subsolution) of (3.1) with the fully
non-linear Hamiltonian Hi (resp. Hi).
Since there is no regularity, even semi-continuity, in the fully non-linear Hamiltonian functions Hi and Hi, this
existence result of viscosity solutions to the fully non-linear PDEs (3.1) is quite general. In general, a comparison
result for the PDEs that we analyze may not hold since it is not clear whether Hi =Hi unless the control spaces
are compact.
Remark 3.2. Given i = 1, 2 and x ∈ Rk, although wi(T, x) = g(x), it is possible that neither wi(T, x) nor wi(T, x)
equals to g(x) since wi may not be continuous in t. This phenomenon already appears in stochastic control problems
with unbounded control; see e.g. [5].
4 Proofs
4.1 Proofs of the results in Section 1
Proof of Proposition 1.1: Set f(s, ω, y, z)
△
= 1{s≥t}f(s, ω, y, z), ∀ (s, ω, y, z)∈ [0, T ] × Ω × R × Rd. Clearly, f is
also a P⊗B(R)⊗B(Rd)/B(R)−measurable function Lipschitz continuous in (y, z). As E
[( ∫ T
0








f(r, Yr , Zr) dr−
∫ T
s
ZrdBr, s ∈ [0, T ]. (4.1)

























. Let (Y˜ ′, Z˜ ′) ∈ Gp
F
([0, t]) be the unique solution
of the following BSDE with zero generator:





Z˜ ′rdBr, s ∈ [0, t].
Actually, Y˜ ′s = E[Y
′













s∈[0,T ] ∈ G
p
F
([0, T ]) also
solves BSDE (4.1). So (Y ′,Z ′) = (Y, Z). In particular, (Y ′s , Z ′s) = (Ys, Zs), ∀ s ∈ [t, T ].
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1AZrdBr, s ∈ [t, T ].
Let (Y A, ZA) ∈ Gp
F
([0, t]) be the unique solution of the following BSDE with zero generator:
Y As = 1AYt −
∫ t
s











s∈[0,T ] ∈ G
p
F











ZAr dBr, s ∈ [0, T ],
where fA(r, ω, y, z)
△
= 1{r≥t}1{ω∈A}f(r, ω, y, z). Since {1{r≥t}∩A}r∈[0,T ] is a right-continuous F−adapted process,
the measurability and Lipschitz continuity of f imply that fA is also a P ⊗ B(R) ⊗ B(R
d)/B(R)−measurable
function Lipschitz continuous in (y, z). Since E
[( ∫ T
0
∣∣fA(s, 0, 0)∣∣ds)p] ≤ E[( ∫ Tt ∣∣f(s, 0, 0)∣∣ds)p] < ∞, applying





∣∣Ys∣∣p] ≤ E[ sup
s∈[0,T ]
∣∣YAs ∣∣p]≤C(T, p, γ)E[1A|η|p+(∫ T
0
∣∣fA(s, 0, 0)∣∣ds)p]







Letting A vary in Ft yields (1.4). 




Y 1 − Y 2, Z1 − Z2
)
, which solves the BSDE
Ŷs = η1 − η2 +
∫ T
s
f̂(r, Ŷr , Ẑr) dr−
∫ T
s
ẐrdBr, s ∈ [t, T ], (4.2)














. Clearly, f̂ is a P⊗B(R)⊗B(Rd)/B(R)−
measurable function Lipschitz continuous in (y, z). Suppose that E
[( ∫ T
t
∣∣f̂(s, 0, 0)∣∣ds)p˜] = E[(∫ T
t
















by Ho¨lder’s inequality, applying Proposi-
















∣∣∣Ft] ≤ C(T, p˜, γ)E[ |η1−η2|p˜ + (∫ T
t
∣∣f̂(s, 0, 0)∣∣ds)p˜∣∣∣∣Ft], P−a.s.,
which is exactly (1.5).










s )≤(resp. ≥) 0, ds×dP−a.s.

















∈ [−γ, γ], s ∈ [t, T ]
defines an F−progressively measurable bounded process. For i = 1, · · · , d, analogous to process a
bis
△








s, Y 2s , (Z
2,1










s, Y 2s , (Z
2,1








∈ [−γ, γ], s∈ [t, T ]
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also defines an F−progressively measurable bounded process.
Then we can alternatively express (4.2) as
Ŷs = η1 − η2+
∫ T
s
(arŶr + br ·Ẑr + δfr) dr−
∫ T
s

































































































































































s∈[t,T ] is a uniformly integrable martingale. Then for
any s ∈ [t, T ], taking E[·|Fs] in (4.3) yields that P−a.s.
QsŶs = E
[




∣∣∣∣Fs] ≤ (resp. ≥) 0, thus Ŷs ≤ (resp. ≥) 0.
By the continuity of process Ŷ , it holds P−a.s. that Y 1s ≤ (resp. ≥)Y
2
s for any s ∈ [t, T ]. 
4.2 Proofs of the Results in Section 2
Proof of Example 2.2: For any (t, u) ∈ [0, T ]× U, the continuity of ϕ and (2.5) show that {v ∈ [−κ|u|, κ|u|] :
ϕ(t, u, v) = 0} is a non-empty closed set. So we can define V (t, u)
△
= min{v ∈ [−κ|u|, κ|u|] : ϕ(t, u, v) = 0}.
Given n ∈ N, for any i = 0, · · ·, 2n − 1 and j ∈ Z, we set tni = i2





V (t, u) ∈











j+1), if i < 2
n − 1,













ψni,j1{(t,u)∈Dni,j}∈ [−κ−κ|u|, κ+κ|u|], ∀ (t, u)∈ [0, T ]×U defines a B([0, T ])⊗B(U)/B(R)
−measurable function. As ψn≤ψn+1, the function ψ(t, u)
△
= lim
n→∞↑ ψn(t, u)∈ [−κ−κ|u|, κ+κ|u|], ∀ (t, u)∈ [0, T ]×U
is also B([0, T ])⊗B(U)/B(R)−measurable.
Now, let (t, u) ∈ [0, T ]× U and ε > 0. By the continuity of ϕ in t, there exists a δ ∈ (0, ε/3γ) such that∣∣ϕ(s, u, ψ(t, u))− ϕ(t, u, ψ(t, u))∣∣ < ε/3, ∀ s ∈ [t− δ, t+ δ] ∩ [0, T ]. (4.5)
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For any n > log2(1 ∨ T )− log2(δ), (t, u) ∈ D
n
i,j for some (i, j) ∈ {0, · · ·, 2
n − 1} × Z, and we can find (t′, u′) ∈ Dni,j
such that V (t′, u′) ≤ ψni,j + δ. Then (4.5) and the Lipschitz continuity of ϕ in (u, v) show that∣∣ϕ(t, u, ψ(t, u))∣∣ = ∣∣ϕ(t, u, ψ(t, u))− ϕ(t′, u′,V (t′, u′))∣∣
≤
∣∣ϕ(t, u, ψ(t, u))−ϕ(t′, u, ψ(t, u))∣∣+∣∣ϕ(t′, u, ψ(t, u))−ϕ(t′, u, ψn(t, u))∣∣+∣∣ϕ(t′, u, ψni,j)−ϕ(t′, u′,V (t′, u′))∣∣
≤ ε/3 + γ
∣∣ψ(t, u)− ψn(t, u)∣∣+ γ(|u− u′|+ |ψni,j − V (t′, u′)|)
≤ ε+ γ
∣∣ψ(t, u)− ψn(t, u)∣∣+ 2γδ ≤ ε+ γ∣∣ψ(t, u)− ψn(t, u)∣∣.
Letting n→∞ yields that
∣∣ϕ(t, u, ψ(t, u))∣∣ ≤ ε. Then as ε→ 0, we obtain that ϕ(t, u, ψ(t, u)) = 0.
Similarly, we can construct a measurable function ψ˜ on [0, T ]× V such that
ϕ
(
t, ψ˜(t, v), v
)
= 0 and |ψ˜(t, v)| ≤ κ(1 + |v|), ∀ (t, v) ∈ [0, T ]× V.
Hence (A-u) and (A-v) are satisfied. 




. Since [[t, τ [[, [[τ, T ]]∈P,
we see that both D1
△
=[[t, τ [[∩ ([t, s]×Ω) and D2
△




⊗Fs. It then follows that{































which shows that the process µ is F−progressively measurable.

























dr <∞. Thus µ ∈ Ut. 








s∈[t,T ] satisfy the same SDE:
Xs = ξ +
∫ s
t
bµ,ντ (r,Xr) dr +
∫ s
t
σµ,ντ (r,Xr) dBr , s ∈ [t, T ], (4.6)
where bµ,ντ (r, ω, x)
△
= 1{r<τ(ω)}bµ,ν(r, ω, x) and σµ,ντ (r, ω, x)
△
= 1{r<τ(ω)}σµ,ν(r, ω, x), ∀ (r, ω, x) ∈ [t, T ] × Ω × Rk.
Like bµ,ν and σµ,ν , bµ,ντ is aP⊗B(R
k)/B(Rk)−measurable function and σµ,ντ is aP⊗B(R
k)/B(Rk×d)−measurable




∣∣bµ,ντ (s, 0)∣∣ ds)2 + (∫ T
t
∣∣σµ,ντ (s, 0)∣∣ ds)2
]
<∞.
Thus (4.6) has a unique solution. It then holds P−a.s. that
Xt,ξ,µ,ντ∧s = X
t,ξ,µ˜,ν˜
τ∧s , ∀ s ∈ [t, T ]. (4.7)



















r,Xt,ξ,µ,νr , µr, νr
)
dBr, s ∈ [t, T ].








































τ∧r , µr, νr
)
dBr, s ∈ [t, T ].
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τ∧r , µr, νr
)
dBr, s ∈ [t, T ].
To wit, X , X˜ ∈ C2
F







σ̂(r,Xr) dBr, s ∈ [t, T ], (4.8)




r, x + Xt,ξ,µ,ντ∧r (ω), µr(ω), νr(ω)
)





Xt,ξ,µ,ντ∧r (ω), µr(ω), νr(ω)
)
, ∀ (r, ω, x) ∈ [t, T ]× Ω× Rk. The measurability of functions b, Xt,ξ,µ,ν , µ and ν implies
that the mapping (r, ω, x) → b
(
r, ω, x + Xt,ξ,µ,ντ∧r (ω), µr(ω), νr(ω)
)
is P ⊗ B(Rk)/B(Rk)−measurable. Clearly,
{1{r≥τ}∩A}r∈[t,T ] is a right-continuous F−adapted process. Thus b̂ is also P ⊗B(Rk)/B(Rk)−measurable. Simi-




∣∣̂b(r, 0)∣∣ dr)2 + (∫ T
t











by (2.1), (2.2) and Ho¨lder’s inequality, the SDE (4.8) admits a unique solution. Hence, P
(
Xs = X˜s, ∀ s ∈ [t, T ]
)
= 1,
which together with (4.7) proves (2.8). 
Proof of Lemma 2.3: For i = 1, 2, let Θi
△






















∣∣fΘ1T (r, Y 2r , Z2r )−fΘ2T (r, Y 2r , Z2r)∣∣ds)p˜]≤cp˜E[ sup
s∈[t,T ]
∣∣XΘ1s −XΘ2s ∣∣ 2p˜p ]≤cp˜{E[ sup
s∈[t,T ]
∣∣XΘ1s −XΘ2s ∣∣2]} p˜p <∞.





∣∣Y 1s −Y 2s ∣∣p˜∣∣Ft] ≤ cp˜E[∣∣g(XΘ1T )−g(XΘ2T )∣∣p˜+∫ T
t





∣∣XΘ1s −XΘ2s ∣∣ 2p˜p ∣∣∣Ft], P−a.s.





∣∣Y 1s −Y 2s ∣∣p˜∣∣∣Ft] ≤ cp˜E[ sup
s∈[t,T ]
∣∣XΘ1s −XΘ2s ∣∣ 2p˜p ∣∣∣Ft] ≤ cp˜|ξ1−ξ2| 2p˜p , P−a.s. 
Proof of Proposition 2.1: Given β∈Bt, (1.4) and Ho¨lder’s inequality imply that∣∣J(t, x, u0, β(u0))∣∣p ≤ E[ sup
s∈[t,T ]
∣∣∣Y t,x,u0,β(u0)s (T, g(Xt,x,u0,β(u0)T ))∣∣∣p∣∣∣Ft]
≤ c0E
[∣∣g(Xt,x,u0,β(u0)T )∣∣p + ∫ T
t








≤κ, ds×dP−a.s., the 2/p−Ho¨lder continuity of g, (2.3), (2.4) as well as a conditional-expectation
version of (2.6) show that P−a.s.
∣∣J(t, x, u0, β(u0))∣∣p ≤ c0 + c0E[∣∣Xt,x,u0,β(u0)T ∣∣2 + ∫ T
t
(∣∣Xt,x,u0,β(u0)s ∣∣2 + [(β(u0))s]2V)ds∣∣∣Ft]













∣∣∣Ft] ≤ cκ + c0|x|2. (4.10)
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So it follows that




t, x, u0, β(u0)
)
≥ −cκ − c0|x|
2/p, P−a.s.
We extensively set ψ(t, u)
△
=v0, ∀ (t, u)∈ [0, T ]×Oκ(u0), then it is B([0, T ])×B(U)/B(V)−measurable. For any





=ψ(s, µs), s∈ [t, T ] (4.11)








∀ s∈ [t, T ]. So βψ(µ)∈Vt. Let µ1, µ2∈Ut such that µ1=µ2, ds×dP−a.s. on [[t, τ [[∪ [[τ, T ]]A for some τ ∈St,T and














Hence, βψ ∈ Bt.
Fix a u♯ ∈ ∂Oκ(u0). For any µ ∈ Ut, similar to (4.9) and (4.10), we can deduce that P−a.s.
∣∣J(t, x, µ, βψ(µ))∣∣p ≤ c0E[∣∣g(Xt,x,µ,βψ(µ)T )∣∣p + ∫ T
t
∣∣f t,x,µ,βψ(µ)T (s, 0, 0)∣∣pds∣∣∣Ft]
≤ c0 + c0E




∣∣f(s,Xt,x,µ,βψ(µ)s , 0, 0, µs, v0)∣∣p
+1{µs /∈Oκ(u0)}
∣∣f(s,Xt,x,µ,βψ(µ)s , 0, 0, u♯, ψ(s, u♯))∣∣p)ds∣∣∣Ft] (4.12)









∣∣b(s, 0, µs, (βψ(µ))s)∣∣ ds)2 + (∫ T
t
∣∣σ(s, 0, µs, (βψ(µ))s)∣∣ ds)2∣∣∣Ft],
where we used a conditional-expectation version of (2.6) in the last inequality. Then an analogous decomposition
and estimation to (4.12) leads to that
∣∣J(t, x, µ, βψ(µ))∣∣p ≤ cκ + c0|x|2, P−a.s. It follows that




t, x, µ, βψ(µ)
)
≤ cκ + c0|x|
2/p, P−a.s.
Similarly, one has |w2(t, x)| ≤ cκ + c0|x|2/p, P−a.s. 
Proof of Proposition 2.2: Let H denote the Cameron-Martin space of all absolutely continuous functions h ∈ Ω
whose derivative h˙ belongs to L2([0, T ],Rd). For any h ∈ H, we define Th(ω)
△
= ω+h, ∀ω ∈ Ω. Clearly, Th : Ω→ Ω
is a bijection and its law is given by Ph
△









P . Fix (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×Rk and
set Ht
△
= {h ∈ H : h(s) = h(s ∧ t), ∀ s ∈ [0, T ]}.
a) Let h∈Ht. We first show that(
µ(Th), ν(Th)
)
∈ Ut × Vt, ∀ (µ, ν) ∈ Ut × Vt. (4.13)










for any D ⊂ [t, s]×Ω. As the
mapping
Th=B+h is Fs/Fs−measurable, (4.14)





Υhs (E ×A) =
{








E ∩ [t, s]
)
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. In particular, ∅ × ∅ ∈ Λhs and [t, s]× Ω ∈ Λ
h
s . For any
D ∈ Λhs and {Dn}n∈N ⊂ Λ
h


























































i.e. ([t, s]× Ω)\D, ∪
n∈N
Dn ∈ Λhs . Thus Λ
h
s is a σ−field of [t, s]× Ω. It follows that
B([t, s]) ⊗Fs = σ
{




, A ∈ Fs
}
⊂ Λhs . (4.15)





(r, ω) ∈ [t, s]× Ω : µr(ω) ∈ U
}






















∈ B([t, s])⊗Fs, (4.16)







ds < ∞ for some q > 2. Then one can deduce from Ho¨lder’s inequality that for any































































































































Hence, µ(Th) ∈ Ut. Similarly, ν(Th) ∈ Vt for any ν ∈ Vt.
b) We next show that
J(t, x, µ, ν)(Th) = J
(
t, x, µ(Th), ν(Th)
)
, P−a.s. (4.18)





ΦrdBr, s ∈ [t, T ].











}, s ∈ [t, T ]}
n∈N
(

















ds = 0 and P− lim
n→∞ sups∈[t,T ]
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Applying Proposition 3.2.26 of [21] yields that






































Φnr (Th)dBr, ∀ s ∈ [t, T ],







(Th), s ∈ [t, T ]. (4.21)
Let (µ, ν)∈Ut×Vt and set Θ=(t, x, µ, ν). By (4.14), the process XΘ(Th) is F−adapted, and the equivalence of
Ph to P implies that X















































∣∣XΘs (Th)∣∣q˜] < ∞ for any q˜ ∈ [2, q). In particular, XΘ(Th) ∈
C2
F
([t, T ],Rk). It follows from (4.21) that

























r,XΘr (Th), µr(Th), νr(Th)
)
dBr, s ∈ [t, T ].
Thus the uniqueness of SDE (1.1) with parameters Θh =
(




















. Analogous to XΘ(Th), Ŷ (Th) is an F−adapted continuous
process. And using the similar arguments that leads to (4.16), we see that the process Ẑ(Th) is F−progressively


























































































Ẑr(Th) dBr, s ∈ [t, T ].
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Thus the uniqueness of BSDE
(











= Ŷs(Th), s ∈ [t, T ].
In particular,










t, x, µ(Th), ν(Th)
)
, P−a.s.
c) Now, we show that w1(t, x)(Th)=w1(t, x), P−a.s.







(Th), ∀µ ∈ Ut.




∈ Vt. Using (4.13) again shows













≤ κ + Cβ [µs(T−h)]U, ds × dP−a.s., the equivalence of


























≤ κ+ Cβ [µs]U , ds× dP − a.s.
Let µ1, µ2 ∈ Ut such that µ1 = µ2, ds × dP−a.s. on [[t, τ [[∪ [[τ, T ]]A for some τ ∈ St,T and A ∈ Fτ . By the
equivalence of P−h to P , µ1 = µ2, ds × dP−h−a.s. on [[t, τ [[∪ [[τ, T ]]A, or µ1(T−h) = µ2(T−h), ds × dP−a.s. on
[[t, τ(T−h)[[∪ [[τ(T−h), T ]]Th(A). Given s ∈ [t, T ], similar to (4.14), T−h is also Fs/Fs−measurable. It follows that
{τ(T−h) ≤ s}=
{















A ∩ {τ ≤ s}
)
∈ Fs,
which shows that τ(T−h) is an F−stopping time and Th(A) ∈ Fτ(T−h). As t ≤ τ ≤ T , P−a.s., the equivalence
of P−h to P shows that t ≤ τ ≤ T , P−h−a.s., or t ≤ τ(T−h) ≤ T , P−a.s. So τ(T−h) ∈ St,T , and we see from








, ds × dP−a.s. on [[t, τ(T−h)[[∪ [[τ(T−h), T ]]Th(A). The equivalence of


















(Th) = βh(µ2), ds× dP−a.s. on [[t, τ [[∪ [[τ, T ]]A. Hence, βh ∈ Bt.






t, x, µ, β(µ)
)
. For any µ ∈ Ut, as I(t, x, β) ≥ J
(
t, x, µ, β(µ)
)
, P−a.s., the equivalence
of Ph to P shows that I(t, x, β) ≥ J
(
t, x, µ, β(µ)
)
, Ph−a.s., or
I(t, x, β)(Th) ≥ J
(
t, x, µ, β(µ)
)
(Th), P−a.s. (4.24)
Let ξ be another random variable such that ξ ≥ J
(
t, x, µ, β(µ)
)
(Th), P−a.s., or ξ(T−h) ≥ J
(
t, x, µ, β(µ)
)
, Ph−a.s.
for any µ ∈ Ut. By the equivalence of Ph to P , it holds for any µ ∈ Ut that ξ(T−h) ≥ J
(
t, x, µ, β(µ)
)
, P−a.s. Taking
essential supremum over µ ∈ Ut yields that ξ(T−h) ≥ I(t, x, β), P−a.s. or ξ ≥ I(t, x, β)(Th), P−h−a.s. Then it











































































t, x, µ, β(µ)
)
=w1(t, x), P−a.s., (4.26)
where we used the facts that
{




βh : β ∈ Bt
}
= Bt.
On Zero-Sum Stochastic Differential Games 20
d) As an Ft−measurable random variable, w1(t, x) only depends on the restriction of ω ∈ Ω to the time interval [0, t].
So (4.26) holds even for any h ∈ H. Then an application of Lemma 3.4 of [11] yields that w1(t, x) = E[w1(t, x)],
P−a.s. Similarly, one can deduce that w2(t, x) = E[w2(t, x)], P−a.s. 
Proof of Proposition 2.3: Let t ∈ [0, T ] and x1, x2 ∈ Rk. For any (β, µ) ∈ Bt × Ut, (2.14) implies that∣∣∣J(t, x1, µ, β(µ))− J(t, x2, µ, β(µ))∣∣∣p ≤ c0|x1−x2|2, P−a.s.
which leads to that
J
(













Taking essential supremum over µ ∈ Ut and then taking essential infimum over β ∈ Bt yield that
w1(t, x2)− c0|x1−x2|
2/p ≤ w1(t, x1) ≤ w1(t, x2) + c0|x1−x2|
2/p.
So
∣∣w1(t, x1)−w1(t, x2)∣∣ ≤ c0|x1−x2|2/p. Similarly, one has ∣∣w2(t, x1)−w2(t, x2)∣∣ ≤ c0|x1−x2|2/p. 
4.3 Proof of the Weak Dynamic Programming Principle
To prove the weak dynamic programming principle (Theorem 2.1), we begin with two auxiliary result. The first
one shows that the pasting of state processes (resp. payoff processes) is exactly the state process (resp. payoff
process) with the pasted controls.



























s , ∀ s ∈ [t, T ]. (4.27)
Moreover, for any {(τi, ηi)}ni=0 ⊂ St,T×L
p(FT ) such that each ηi is Fτi−measurable, if τ0=
∑n
i=1 1Aiτi, P−a.s. and
if η0=
∑n

















, ∀ s ∈ [t, T ]. (4.28)






i, νi), P−a.s. (4.29)
Proof: Let
(


























For any s ∈ [t, T ] and i = 1, · · ·, n, multiplying 1Ai to SDE (1.1) with parameters (t, ξi, µ
i, νi), we can deduce that
1AiX
i







r) dr + 1Ai
∫ s
t





















































r ) dBr, P−a.s. (4.30)
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Adding them up over i ∈ {1, · · ·, n} and using the continuity of process X show that P−a.s.














r ) dBr, s ∈ [t, T ].
So X = Xt,ξ0,µ
0,ν0 , i.e. (4.27).





























































































































t from above and w1(t, x) = essinf
β∈Bt
I(t, x, β) from
below:





n∈N ⊂ Ft × Ut with
lim
n→∞↑ 1An = 1, P−a.s. such that for any n ∈ N
J
(




I(t, x, β)− ε
)





n∈N ⊂ Ft ×Bt with limn→∞↑ 1An = 1, P−a.s. such that for any n ∈ N




− ε, P−a.s. on An. (4.32)








t, x, µ2, β(µ2)
)




































Thus, µ̂ ∈ Ut. As µ̂ = µ
1 on [t, T ]×A, taking (τ, A) = (t, A) in Definition 2.2 yields that β(µ̂) = β(µ1), ds×dP−a.s.
on [t, T ]×A. Similarly, β(µ̂) = β(µ2), ds× dP−a.s. on [t, T ]×Ac. So β(µ̂) = 1Aβ(µ1) + 1Acβ(µ2), ds× dP−a.s.
Then (4.29) shows that
J
(
















t, x, µ2, β(µ2)
)
, P−a.s.,




t, x, µ, β(µ)
)}
µ∈Ut is directed upwards (see Theorem A.32 of [17]). By Propo-




i∈N ⊂ Ut such that










t, x, µ˜i, β(µ˜i)
)
, P−a.s. (4.33)
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So I(t, x, β) is Ft−measurable.

































1 also defines a Ut−process. For i = 1, · · · , n,
as µn = µ˜i on [t, T ] × Âi, taking (τ, A) = (t, Âi) in Definition 2.2 shows that β(µn) = β(µ˜i), ds × dP−a.s. on
[t, T ] × Âi. Then (4.29) implies that 1ÂiJ
(




t, x, µ˜i, β(µ˜i)
)
, P−a.s. Adding them up over
i∈{1, · · ·, n} gives
1AnJ
(





















t, x, µ˜i, β(µ˜i)
)
≥
I(t, x, β) − ε
}









. It follows that





t, x, µ˜i, β(µ˜i)
)


















n→∞↑ 1An = 1, P−a.s.
(ii) Let β1, β2 ∈ Bt. We just showed that I(t, x, β1) and I(t, x, β2) are Ft−measurable, so Ao
△
= {I(t, x, β1) ≤
I(t, x, β2)} belongs to Ft. For any µ∈Ut, similar to µ̂ above, βo(µ)
△
=1Aoβ1(µ) + 1Acoβ2(µ) defines a Vt−process.














≤ κ+ (C1∨C2) [µs]U , ds× dP − a.s.





2), ds×dP−a.s. on [[t, τ [[∪ [[τ, T ]]A. Then it follows that for ds×dP−a.s.




































Hence, βo ∈ Bt.
For any µ ∈ Ut, (4.29) shows that J
(








t, x, µ, β2(µ)
)
, P−a.s. Then
taking essential supremum over µ ∈ Ut and using Lemma 2.4 (2) yield that
I(t, x, βo) = 1AoI(t, x, β1) + 1AcoI(t, x, β2) = I(t, x, β1) ∧ I(t, x, β2), P−a.s.
Thus the collection {I(t, x, β)}β∈Bt is directed downwards (see Theorem A.32 of [17]). By Proposition VI-1-1 of




i∈N ⊂ Bt such that
w1(t, x) = essinf
β∈Bt















≤ w1(t, x) + ε
}

















i=1 1Âi β˜i(µ)+1Acn β˜1(µ) defines a Vt−process. For
i=1, · · ·, n, let C˜i>0 be the constant associated to β˜i in Definition 2.2 (i). Setting Cn
△


















≤ κ+ Cn[µs]U , ds× dP − a.s.
Let µ1, µ2∈Ut such that µ1=µ2, ds× dP−a.s. on [[t, τ [[∪ [[τ, T ]]A for some τ ∈ St,T and A ∈ Fτ . Similar to (4.34),
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So βn ∈ Bt. For any µ ∈ Ut, applying (4.29) again yields that 1AnJ
(






t, x, µ, β˜i(µ)
)
,
P−a.s. Taking essential supremum over µ ∈ Ut and using Lemma 2.4 (2) again yield that









w1(t, x) + ε
)
, P−a.s.
Let N˜ be the P−null set such that (4.35) holds on N˜ c. As |w1(t, x)| <∞ by Proposition 2.1 and Proposition 2.2,






A˜i = N˜ c. 
In the proof of the weak dynamic programming principle below, we first use Lemma 4.2 to construct approxi-
mately optimal controls/strategies by pasting locally approximately optimal ones according to a finite partition of
Oδ(t, x) determined by the continuity of test functions φ and φ˜. After a series of estimates on state processes and
payoff processes, we obtain the weak dynamic programming principle by using the stochastic backward semigroup
property (2.11), the continuous dependence of payoff process on the initial state (see Lemma 2.3) as well as the
control-neutralizer assumption and the growth condition on strategies.
Proof of Theorem 2.1: 1) For any m ∈ N and (s, x)∈ [t, T ]× Rk, the continuity of φ, φ˜ shows that there exists
a δms,x ∈ (0, 1/m) such that∣∣φ(s′, x′)− φ(s, x)∣∣ + ∣∣φ˜(s′, x′)− φ˜(s, x)∣∣ ≤ 1/m, ∀ (s′, x′) ∈ [(s− δms,x) ∨ t, (s+ δms,x) ∧ T ]×Oδms,x(x). (4.36)












(s,x)∈[t,T ]×Rk has a finite subcollection
{Dm(si, xi)}
Nm
i=1 to cover Oδ(t, x). For i = 1, · · ·, Nm, we set ti
△
= (si + δ
m
si,xi) ∧ T .
Fix (β, µ) ∈ Bt × Ut and simply denote τβ,µ by τ . By Lemma 2.1, µ̂s
△
= 1{s<τ}µs + 1{s≥τ}u0, s ∈ [t, T ] defines










t, x, µ̂, β(µ̂)
)
.
1a) Given s ∈ [t, T ), we first show that along µ̂|[t,s], the restriction of β over [s, T ] is still an admissible strategy,
which will be used in the next step to choose the locally approximately optimal controls, see (4.38).








































































Let µ˜1, µ˜2∈Us such that µ˜
1= µ˜2, dr × dP−a.s. on [[s, ζ[[∪ [[ζ, T ]]A for some ζ ∈Ss,T and A∈Fζ . Then µ̂ ⊕s µ˜
1 =
µ̂⊕s µ˜2, dr×dP−a.s. on [[t, ζ[[∪ [[ζ, T ]]A. By Definition 2.2, β(µ̂⊕s µ˜1) = β(µ̂⊕s µ˜2), dr×dP−a.s. on [[t, ζ[[∪ [[ζ, T ]]A.



























|φ(s, x)| : (s, x) ∈ Oδ+3(t, x) ∩ ([t, T ] × Rk)
}
. According to the finite cover
{Dm(si, xi)}
Nm
i=1 of Oδ(t, x), we use (4.31) to construct the 1/m−optimal control µ
m for player I under strategy β
by pasting together local 1/m−optimal controls.
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∣∣∣Y Θ̂s (T, g(XΘ̂T ))∣∣∣p + (Cφx,δ)p)] = 0.



































⊂{τ≤ ti}, we see that A˜mi = A˜
m
i ∩ {τ≤ ti}∈Fti .




i=1 forms a partition of N
c for some













































. As [[t, τ [[∈P, we see that D
△





measurability of µ̂ then implies that{

























= [[τ, T ]]A˜mi ∩Ami ∩ ([t, s] × Ω) =
([ti, T ]∩ [t, s])× (A˜mi ∩A
m





∩ ([t, s]×Ω)=([ti, T ] ∩ [t, s])×A
m
i are empty. Otherwise, if s≥ ti,












⊗Fs. Using a similar argument to (4.39)
on the F−progressive measurability of process µmi yields that{















































dr<∞ for some qi > 2. Setting q∗
△
































t, x, µm, β(µm)
)
. We shall use a series of estimates on state processes Xt,ξ,µ,ν/payoff processes
Y t,ξ,µ,ν , a stochastic backward semigroup property (2.11) as well as the continuous dependence of Y t,ξ,µ,ν on ξ to
demonstrate how J
(
t, x, µm, β(µm)
)






, which will eventually lead to
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As µm= µ̂=µ on [[t, τ [[, taking (τ, A) = (τ, ∅) in Definition 2.2 shows that β(µm)=β(µ), ds× dP−a.s. on [[t, τ [[,
and then applying (2.8) with (τ, A) = (τ, ∅) yields that P−a.s.
XΘms = X
Θ
s ∈ Oδ(x), ∀ s ∈ [t, τ ]. (4.41)








are essentially the same. To wit,(




Y Θ(τ, η), ZΘ(τ, η)
)
. (4.42)













































































∣∣∣∣ , s∈ [t, T ]. (4.43)
Let C(κ, x, δ) denote a generic constant, depending on κ+ |x|+δ, Cφx,δ, T , γ, p and |g(0)|, whose form may vary
from line to line. Squaring both sides of (4.43) and taking expectation, we can deduce from Ho¨lder’s inequality,


























∣∣XΘmτm∧r′−XΘτ∧r′∣∣2]dr+C(κ, x, δ)m P (A), ∀ s∈ [t, T ], (4.44)
where we used the facts that














≤ κ, dr × dP − a.s. on [[τ, τm[[. (4.45)















∣∣XΘmτm∧r−XΘτ∧r∣∣2∣∣∣Ft] ≤ C(κ, x, δ)m , P−a.s. (4.46)













T , P−a.s. It




























= J(Θtim), P−a.s. (4.47)
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+1(A˜mi ∩Ami )c µ̂s, s∈ [t, T ]
also defines a Ut−process. As µm= µ̂mi on [[t, τm[[∪ [[τm, T ]]A˜mi ∩Ami and µ̂
m








[ti, T ]×(A˜mi ∩
Ami )
)





















































, ds× dP−a.s. on
[ti, T ]×(A˜mi ∩A
m






















































×Oδmsi,xi (xi) ⊂ Oδ+2
√
2δmsi,xi





(t, x) ⊂ Oδ+3(t, x).
So φ(ti, xi) ≤ C
φ





, P−a.s. Then it
follows from (4.38) that












+ 1/m, P−a.s. on Ami .
As
∣∣XΘτ − xi∣∣2/p < (δmsi,xi)2/p < m−2/p ≤ 1/m on A˜mi , we can also deduce from (2.14), (4.36) and the continuity of


































































2/p △= η˜m ∈ Lp(Fτm). (4.48)
By (2.10), it holds P−a.s. that∣∣Y Θt (τ, ηm)−Y Θt (τ, φ(τ,XΘτ ))∣∣p≤c0E[∣∣ηm−φ(τ,XΘτ )∣∣p∣∣∣Ft] ≤ c0mp . (4.49)
Let (Y m, Zm) ∈ Gp
F
([t, T ]) be the unique solution of the following BSDE with zero generator:





Zmr dBr, s ∈ [t, T ].
For any s ∈ [t, T ], one can deduce that
Y mτ∧s = E[Y
m
τ∧s|Fτ ] = E
[




∣∣∣Fτ] = Y Θmτ (τm, ηm)− ∫ τ
τ∧s
Zmr dBr, P−a.s.
By the continuity of process Y m, it holds P−a.s. that










1{r<τ}Zmr dBr, s ∈ [t, T ]. (4.50)













Y Θmτ (τm, ηm)
∣∣Fτ∧s], ∀ s∈ [t, T ].
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On the other hand, let (Y˜ m, Z˜m) ∈ Gp
F
([t, T ]) be the unique solution of the following BSDE with zero generator:
Y˜ ms = ηm −
∫ T
s
Z˜mr dBr, s ∈ [t, T ]. (4.51)
Similar to (Y m, Zm), it holds P−a.s. that(










and Y˜ ms =E[ηm|Fτ∧s], ∀ s∈ [t, T ]. (4.52)


























































Zmr dBr, s ∈ [t, T ]. (4.53)





∣∣fΘmτm (s, Y˜ ms , Z˜ms )∣∣pds]≤cpE[∫ T
t
∣∣fΘmτm (s, 0, 0)∣∣pds+ sup
s∈[t,T ]
∣∣Y˜ ms ∣∣p+(∫ T
t
∣∣Z˜ms ∣∣2ds)p/2] <∞,
applying (1.5) to Ym − Y˜ m and using (4.52) yield that
E
[∣∣Y Θmτ (τm, ηm)−ηm∣∣p∣∣∣Ft]=E[∣∣Ymτ −Y˜ mτ ∣∣p∣∣∣Ft]≤E[ sup
s∈[t,T ]
∣∣Yms −Y˜ ms ∣∣p∣∣∣Ft]≤c0E[ ∫ T
τ




∣∣f(s,XΘmτm∧s, ηm, 0, u0, (β(µm))s)∣∣pds∣∣∣Ft], P−a.s. (4.54)






∣∣XΘmτm∧s −XΘτ∧s∣∣2 + |XΘτ∧s|2 + |ηm|p + [(β(µm))s]2V)ds∣∣∣Ft]
≤ c0E
[
(τm − τ) · sup
s∈[t,T ]

















































As µm= µ̂ on [[t, τm[[, taking (τ, A) = (τm, ∅) in Definition 2.2 shows that β(µm)=β(µ̂), ds × dP−a.s. on [[t, τm[[,
and then applying (2.8) with (τ, A) = (τm, ∅) yields that P−a.s.
XΘms = X
Θ̂
s , ∀ s ∈ [t, τm]. (4.57)








i . As µ
m= µ̂ on [[t, τm[[∪ [[τm, T ]]A˜mi \Ami , Defi-
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i ). Then by (4.29) and a similar argument to (4.47), it holds






































































∈ Fτm . Clearly,
1A˜m ≤ 1Am , P−a.s. Applying (2.10) again, we can deduce from (4.46) and (4.58) that P−a.s.∣∣Y Θmt (τm, η̂m)−Y Θmt (τm, ηm)∣∣p≤ c0E[∣∣η̂m−ηm∣∣p∣∣∣Ft] = c0E[1A˜cm∣∣η˜m−ηm∣∣p + 1A˜m∣∣Y Θmτm (T, g(XΘmT ))−ηm∣∣p∣∣∣Ft]
≤ c0E

















∣∣∣Y Θ̂s (T, g(XΘ̂T ))∣∣∣p + (Cφx,δ)p)∣∣∣Ft]. (4.59)























































∣∣∣Y Θ̂s (T, g(XΘ̂T ))∣∣∣p + (Cφx,δ)p)∣∣∣Ft] > 1/m}, one can deduce that


















∣∣∣Y Θ̂s (T, g(XΘ̂T ))∣∣∣p + (Cφx,δ)p)] ≤ m−p.
Multiplying 1Âcm











































= 1 and thus
lim
m→∞1Âm = 0, P−a.s. (4.62)














, P−a.s. Taking essential
supremum over µ ∈ Ut and then taking essential infimum over β ∈ Bt, we obtain (4.40).
1d) Now let us show the other inequality of Theorem 2.1 (1 ). Similar to µm, we shall first use (4.32) to construct
the 1/m−optimal strategy βm by pasting together local 1/m−optimal strategies with respect to the finite cover
{Dm(si, xi)}
Nm
i=1 of Oδ(t, x).
Fixm ∈ N. For i = 1, · · ·, Nm, (4.32) shows that there exists (Ami , β
m














− 1/m, P−a.s. on Ami . (4.63)
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, ∀ s ∈ [t, T ],


















≤ κ+ (Cβ ∨ κ)[µs]U. (4.64)
To see β̂ ∈ Bt, we let µ1, µ2 ∈ Ut such that µ1 = µ2, ds× dP−a.s. on [[t, τ [[∪ [[τ, T ]]A for some τ ∈ St,T
and A ∈ Fτ . Since β(µ
1) = β(µ2), ds×dP−a.s. on [[t, τ [[∪ [[τ, T ]]A by Definition 2.2, it holds ds×dP−a.s. on(
[[t, τ [[∪ [[t, T ]]A
)





























τ∧s , ∀ s ∈ [t, T ]. (4.66)
Then it holds for any ω ∈ A ∩ N c that
τµ1(ω) = inf
{































































= τµ2(ω) ≥ τµ1(ω).
Similarly, it holds on Ao ∩ {τµ2≤ τµ1} ∩ N
c that τµ1 = τµ2 . So
τµ1 = τµ2 on A˜
△
= (A ∪ Ao) ∩ N c. (4.67)
Since [[t, τ [[∩ [[τµ1∧τµ2 , T ]]=[[τµ1∧τµ2 , τ [[Ao and [[t, T ]]A ∩ [[τµ1∧τµ2 , T ]]=[[τµ1∧τµ2 , T ]]A, (4.67) leads to that(
[[t, τ [[∪ [[t, T ]]A
)
∩ [[τµ1 ∧ τµ2 , T ]]N c ⊂ [[τµ1 ∧ τµ2 , T ]]A˜ = [[τµ1 , T ]]A˜ ∩ [[τµ2 , T ]]A˜.
Thus it holds ds×dP−a.s. on
(
[[t, τ [[∪ [[t, T ]]A
)













together with (4.65) shows that β̂ ∈ Bt.










t, x, µ, β̂(µ)
)





















i=1 forms a partition of N
c
µ for some P−null set Nµ. Then we can define































































We claim that βm is a Bt−strategy. Using a similar argument to that in part (1b) for the measurability of the
pasted control µm, one can deduce that the process βm(µ) is F−progressively measurable. For i = 1, · · ·, Nm, let
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Cmi > 0 be the constant associated to β
m
i in Definition 2.2 (i). Setting Cm = Cβ ∨ κ ∨max{C
m
i : i = 1, · · ·, Nm},








































































Hence βm(µ) ∈ Vt.
Let µ1, µ2∈Ut such that µ1=µ2, ds×dP−a.s. on [[t, τ [[∪ [[τ, T ]]A for some τ ∈St,T and A∈Fτ . As β̂(µ1)= β̂(µ2),
ds×dP−a.s. on [[t, τ [[∪ [[τ, T ]]A by Definition 2.2, it holds ds×dP−a.s. on
(


































, ds×dP−a.s. on [[t, τ [[∪ [[τ, T ]]A. So we again have (4.66)
except on a P−null set N , and (4.67) still holds on A˜
△
= (A ∪ Ao) ∩ N c with Ao={τ≥ τµ1∧τµ2}. Plugging (4.67)





τµ2 holds on A˜. (4.71)
Given i = 1, · · ·, Nm. since it holds ds×dP−a.s. on
(

















, taking (τ, A) = (τ ∨ ti, A) in Definition 2.2 with respect to βmi yields that for
ds×dP−a.s. (s, ω)∈ [[ti, τ ∨ ti[[∪ [[τ ∨ ti, T ]]A=
(


















Given ω ∈ Ai
△
= A˜ ∩ Aµ
1,m













∈ Dm(si, xi)\ ∪
j<i
Dm(sj , xj), i.e., ω ∈ A
µ2,m
i .




i , and it follows that 1Aiτ
m
µ1 = 1Aiti = 1Aiτ
m
µ2 . Then one can deduce that(




µ2 , T ]]Ai∩Ami =
(



















which together with (4.72) shows that for ds× dP−a.s. (s, ω) ∈
(
[[t, τ [[∪ [[t, T ]]A
)
∩ [[τmµ1 ∧ τ
m










































. So (4.70) also
holds ds × dP−a.s. on
(
[[t, τ [[∪ [[t, T ]]A
)
∩ [[τmµ1 ∧ τ
m
µ2 , T ]]Ai\Ami . Combining this with (4.74) and then letting i run











, ds× dP − a.s. on
(
[[t, τ [[∪ [[t, T ]]A
)
∩ [[τmµ1 ∧ τ
m
µ2 , T ]]A∪Ao. (4.75)
As [[τmµ1 ∧ τ
m
µ2 , T ]]Ac∩Aco ⊂ [[τµ1 ∧ τµ2 , T ]]Ac∩Aco ⊂ [[τ, T ]]Ac∩Aco ⊂ [[τ, T ]]Ac , one can deduce that
(





µ2 , T ]]A∪Ao =
(
[[t, τ [[∪ [[t, T ]]A
)
∩ [[τmµ1 ∧ τ
m
µ2 , T ]]. Therefore, (4.75) together with (4.70) implies that βm ∈ Bt.
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t, x, µ, βm(µ)
)
. We shall do similar estimates to those in part (c) to conclude






















s ∈ Oδ(x), ∀ s ∈ [t, τµ]. (4.77)
















are essentially the same. To wit,(
Y Θ
m









Given A ∈ Ft, similar to (4.43), we can deduce from (4.77) that
1A sup
r∈[t,s]



















∣∣∣∣∣ , s∈ [t, T ].
where we used the fact that βm(µ) = β̂(µ) = βψ(µ) on [[τµ, τ
m





|φ˜(s, x)| : (s, x) ∈ Oδ+3(t, x)∩ ([t, T ]×Rk)
}
, T , γ, p and |g(0)|, whose form may vary from






m , P−a.s., using similar arguments to those that lead to (4.44)










∣∣b(r,XΘmµτmµ ∧r, µr, ψ(r, µr))∣∣2dr+8E∫ τmµ ∧s
τµ∧s
1A








∣∣XΘmµτmµ ∧r′−XΘµτµ∧r′∣∣2]dr+ C˜(κ, x, δ)m P (A), ∀ s∈ [t, T ].





∣∣XΘmµτmµ ∧r−XΘµτµ∧r∣∣2∣∣∣Ft] ≤ C˜(κ, x, δ)m , P−a.s. (4.79)

















































, one can deduce from
(4.80), (4.29) and (2.14) that it holds P−a.s. on Aµ,mi ∩ A
m










































∣∣XΘµτµ − xi∣∣2/p < (δmsi,xi)2/p < m−2/p ≤ 1/m on Aµ,mi , we can also deduce from (2.14), (4.63), (4.36) and the























































= ηmµ ∈ L
∞(Fτµ).
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≤ ηmµ + c0
∣∣∣XΘmµτmµ −XΘµτµ ∣∣∣2/p△= η˜mµ ∈ Lp(Fτmµ ).
By (2.10), it holds P−a.s. that∣∣∣Y Θµt (τµ, ηmµ )−Y Θµt (τµ, φ˜(τµ, XΘµτµ ))∣∣∣p ≤ c0E[∣∣ηmµ −φ˜(τµ, XΘµτµ )∣∣p∣∣∣Ft] ≤ c0mp . (4.81)
Similar to (4.54), one can deduce that
E
[∣∣∣Y Θmµτµ (τmµ , ηmµ )− ηmµ ∣∣∣p∣∣∣Ft] ≤ c0E[ ∫ T
τµ




∣∣∣f(s,XΘmµτmµ ∧s, ηmµ , 0, µs, ψ(s, µs))∣∣∣pds∣∣∣Ft], P−a.s.




(∣∣∣XΘmµτmµ ∧s −XΘµτµ∧s∣∣∣2 + ∣∣XΘµτµ∧s∣∣2 + |ηmµ |p + cκ)ds∣∣∣Ft] ≤ C˜(κ, x, δ)m , P−a.s.
















































































As βm(µ)= β̂(µ), ds× dP−a.s. on [[t, τmµ [[, applying (2.8) with (τ, A) = (τ
m





s , ∀ s ∈ [t, τ
m
µ ]. (4.83)































i ). Then by (4.29) and a


































































































r,XΘ̂µr , µr, ψ(r, µr)
)
dBr, s ∈ [t, T ].
It then follows from (4.77) that
1A sup
r∈[t,s]
∣∣∣XΘ̂µτµ∨r∣∣∣ ≤ 1A(|x|+δ)+∫ s
t
1{r≥τµ}1A











∣∣∣∣, s∈ [t, T ].
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Using an analogous decomposition and estimation to (4.12), one can deduce from Ho¨lder’s inequality, Doob’s





∣∣∣XΘ̂µτµ∨r∣∣∣2]≤ C˜(κ, x, δ)P (A)+c0E∫ s
t
1{r≥τµ}1A
(∣∣b(r,XΘ̂µr , µr, ψ(r, µr))∣∣2+∣∣σ(r,XΘ̂µr , µr, ψ(r, µr))∣∣2)dr










∣∣∣XΘ̂µτµ∨r′∣∣∣2]dr, ∀ s∈ [t, T ].









∣∣∣XΘ̂µr ∣∣∣2] = E[1A sup
r∈[t,T ]





∣∣∣XΘ̂µr ∣∣∣2∣∣∣∣Ft] ≤ C˜(κ, x, δ), P−a.s. (4.85)
Let (Ŷ µ, Ẑµ) ∈ Gp
F
([t, T ]) be the unique solution of the following BSDE with zero generator:













Ẑµr dBr, s ∈ [t, T ].




















































Ẑµr dBr, s ∈ [0, T ].





∣∣∣Y Θ̂µs (T, g(XΘ̂µT ))∣∣∣p∣∣∣Ft] ≤ E[ sup
s∈[t,T ]
∣∣Ŷµs ∣∣p∣∣∣Ft] ≤ c0E[∣∣∣g(XΘ̂µT )∣∣∣p+∫ T
τµ




∣∣∣f(s,XΘ̂µs , 0, 0, µs, ψ(s, µs))∣∣∣pds∣∣∣Ft].





∣∣∣Y Θ̂µs (T, g(XΘ̂µT ))∣∣∣p∣∣∣∣Ft] ≤ cκ + c0E[ sup
s∈[τµ,T ]


































∈ Fτmµ . Clearly,
1A˜mµ ≤ 1Amµ , P−a.s. Applying (2.10) with p˜ =
1+p
2 , we can deduce from Ho¨lder’s inequality, (4.79) and (4.84) that∣∣∣Y Θmµt (τmµ , η̂mµ )−Y Θmµt (τmµ , ηmµ )∣∣∣p˜≤c0E[∣∣η̂mµ −ηmµ ∣∣p˜∣∣∣Ft]=c0E[1(A˜mµ )c ∣∣η˜mµ −ηmµ ∣∣p˜+1A˜mµ ∣∣∣Y Θmµτmµ (T, g(XΘmµT ))−ηmµ ∣∣∣p˜
∣∣∣∣Ft]
≤c0E




















∣∣∣Ft]} p−p˜p {E[ sup
s∈[τµ,T ]












∣∣∣Ft]} p−p˜p , P−a.s. (4.86)
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Applying (2.11) with (ζ, τ, η) =
(





















































































∣∣∣Ft] > m 1+p1−p}, one can deduce that















Multiplying 1Âcm to both sides of (4.87) yields that
1ÂcmJ
(

















Since Âm does not depend on µ nor on β, taking essential supremum over µ ∈ Ut and applying Lemma 2.4 (2)
yield that



















Then taking essential infimum over β ∈ Bt and using Lemma 2.4 (2) again, we obtain



























m−p < ∞, similar to (4.62), Borel-Cantelli theorem implies that lim
m→∞1Âm = 0, P−a.s.
Thus, letting m→∞ in (4.88) yields (4.76). 
2) For any (t, x, y, z, u, v) ∈ [0, T ]× Rk × R× Rd × U× V, we define
g(x)
△
= −g(x) and f(t, x, y, z, u, v)
△
= −f(t, x,−y,−z, u, v).


















s,XΘs (ω), y, z, µs(ω), νs(ω)
)
, ∀ (s, ω, y, z) ∈ [t, T ]× Ω× R× Rd.





































, where α∈At is player I’s strategic response. The corresponding priority
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Let t ∈ (0, T ] and let φ, φ˜ : [t, T ] × Rk→R be two continuous functions satisfying φ(s, x) ≤ w2(s, x)≤ φ˜(s, x),
(s, x)∈ [t, T ]×Rk. As −φ˜(s, x) ≤ w2(s, x) ≤ −φ(s, x), (s, x)∈ [t, T ]×Rk, applying the weak dynamic programming






























Multiplying −1 above and using (4.89), we obtain the weak dynamic programming principle for w2. 
4.4 Proofs of Section 3
We will prove that wi and wi, i = 1, 2 are viscosity solutions of (3.1) in a standard way: Assume oppositely that
the corresponding inequality of (3.1) does not hold for some test function ϕ. We decompose Hi or Hi with ϕ in the
reverse inequality until we reach a similar reverse inequality satisfied by a control µ̂ or a strategy β̂. Then applying
the comparison result of BSDE, i.e. Proposition 1.2 (2), to such an inequality leads to a contradiction to the weak
dynamic programming principle.
Proof of Theorem 3.1: We only need to prove for w1 and w1, then the results of w2 and w2 follow by a similar
transformation to that used in the proof of Theorem 2.1, part (2).






be such that w1(t0, x0) = ϕ(t0, x0) and that w1−ϕ attains a strict local minimum at (t0, x0), i.e.,
for some δ0 ∈
(
0, t0 ∧ (T − t0)
)











by (y0, z0,Γ0). If H1
(








t0, x0, y0, z0,Γ0
)
≥ 0
holds automatically. To make a contradiction, we assume that when H1
(










t0, x0, y0, z0,Γ0
)
> 0. (4.91)
For any (t, x, y, z,Γ, u, v)∈ [0, T ]×Rk×R×Rd×Sk×U×V, one can deduce from (2.1)−(2.4) that∣∣H(t, x, y, z,Γ, u, v)∣∣≤ 1
4
|σσT (t, x, u, v)|2+
1
4
|Γ|2+γ|z||b(t, x, u, v)|+γ
(







































= |y0|+ |z0|+ |Γ0| =
∣∣ϕ(t0, x0)∣∣+ ∣∣Dxϕ(t0, x0)∣∣+ ∣∣D2xϕ(t0, x0)∣∣, and fix a u♯ ∈ ∂Oκ(u0). For any u /∈ Oκ(u0),
we see from (A-u) that ψ(t0, u) ∈ Ou, and it follows from (4.92) that
inf
v∈Ou
H(t0, x0, y0, z0,Γ0, u, v) ≤
∣∣H(t0, x0, y0, z0,Γ0, u, ψ(t0, u))∣∣
=
∣∣H(t0, x0, y0, z0,Γ0, u♯, ψ(t0, u♯))∣∣ ≤ 1
4
(C0ϕ)
2 + C0ϕC(κ, x0) + C(κ, x0). (4.93)
Here C(κ, x0) denotes a generic constant, depending on κ, |x0|, T , γ, p and |g(0)|, whose form may vary from line
to line.
Similarly, it holds for any u ∈ Oκ(u0) that
inf
v∈Ou
H(t0, x0, y0, z0,Γ0, u, v) ≤
∣∣H(t0, x0, y0, z0,Γ0, u, v0)∣∣ ≤ 1
4
(C0ϕ)
2 + C0ϕC(κ, x0) + C(κ, x0),
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which together with (4.93) implies that
H1
(










2 + C0ϕC(κ, x0) + C(κ, x0) <∞.
Thus ̺ <∞.
As ϕ ∈ C1,2
(
[0, T ]× Rk
)





H(t, x, ϕ(t, x), Dxϕ(t, x), D
2







Moreover, there exists a δ ∈ (0, δ0) such that
inf
v∈Oû
H(t, x, ϕ(t, x), Dxϕ(t, x), D
2





















(t0, x0) is compact, there









and satisfies ℘= lim
n→∞↓ (w1−ϕ)(tn, xn). The lower semicontinuity of w1 and the continuity of ϕ imply that w1 − ϕ










= (w1−ϕ)(t∗, x∗) > 0. (4.95)









j∈N be a sequence of O δ6 (t0, x0) such that
lim
j→∞
(tj , xj) = (t0, x0) and lim
j→∞
w1(tj , xj) = w1(t0, x0) = ϕ(t0, x0) = lim
j→∞
ϕ(tj , xj).
So one can find a j ∈ N such that
























∈ Stj ,T .
Since
∣∣(T,XΘT )−(tj, xj)∣∣≥T−tj≥T−t0−|tj−t0|>δ0− δ6 > 56δ> 23δ, the continuity of XΘ implies that P−a.s.






(tj , xj) ⊂ O 5
6 δ




















+ ℘˜(τ ∧ s), s ∈ [tj , T ] defines a bounded
F−adapted continuous process. By Itoˆ’s formula,






ZrdBr, s ∈ [tj , T ], (4.99)
















































, the measurability of b, σ, XΘ, û and β(µ̂) implies that both Z and f are F−progressively
































<∞, i.e. Z ∈ H2,p
F
(











∣∣Dxϕ(t, x)∣∣ <∞. Hence, {(Ys,Zs)}s∈[tj ,T ] solves the BSDE(tj ,YT , f).
Let ℓ(x) = cκ+c0|x|2/p, x ∈ Rk be the function appeared in Proposition 2.1. Let θ1 : [0, T ]×Rk → [0, 1] be a
continuous function such that θ1≡0 on O 5
6 δ
(t0, x0) and θ1≡1 on ([0, T ]×Rk)
∖
Oδ(t0, x0). Also, let θ2 : [0, T ]×Rk→
[0, 1] be another continuous function such that θ2≡0 on O δ
3











ϕ(t, x) + ℘θ2(t, x)
)
, ∀ (t, x) ∈ [tj , T ]× R
k, (4.101)
which is a continuous function satisfying φ ≤ w1: given (t, x) ∈ [tj , T ]× Rk,
• if (t, x) ∈ O δ
3
(t0, x0), (4.90) shows that φ(t, x) = ϕ(t, x) ≤ w1(t, x) ≤ w1(t, x);




(t0, x0), since ϕ(t, x)+℘θ2(t, x)≤ϕ(t, x)+℘≤w1(t, x)≤w1(t, x) by (4.95), one can deduce
from Proposition 2.1 that φ(t, x) ≤ w1(t, x);
• if (t, x) /∈ Oδ(t0, x0), φ(t, x) = −ℓ(x) ≤ w1(t, x).





















≤ κ + Cβ [µ̂s]U = κ + Cβ [û]U ∈ Oû, (4.97), (4.94) and















̺+ γ℘˜T + f
(
















, ∀ s ∈ [tj , T ].






6 t0, we obtain
ϕ(tj , xj) +
5
6



































, ∀µ ∈ Utj . Taking essential infimum over β ∈ Btj
and applying Theorem 2.1 with (t, x, δ) = (tj , xj ,
2


























A contradiction appears. Therefore, w1 is a viscosity supersolution of (3.1) with Hamiltonian H1.
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b) Next, we show that w1 is a viscosity subsolution of (3.1) with Hamiltonian H1. Let (t0, x0, ϕ) ∈ (0, T )× Rk ×
C1,2
(
[0, T ]× Rk
)
be such that w1(t0, x0) = ϕ(t0, x0) and that w1 − ϕ attains a strict local maximum at (t0, x0),
i.e., for some δ0 ∈
(
0, t0 ∧ (T − t0)
)











by (y0, z0,Γ0). If H1
(








t0, x0, y0, z0,Γ0
)
≤ 0
holds automatically. To make a contradiction, we assume that when H1
(










t0, x0, y0, z0,Γ0
)
> 0. (4.104)
It is easy to see that
H1
(






H(t0, x0, y0, z0,Γ0, u, v) ≥ lim
n→∞↓ infv∈Onu0
H(t0, x0, y0, z0,Γ0, u0, v)
= inf
v∈Oκ(v0)
H(t0, x0, y0, z0,Γ0, u0, v). (4.105)







∣∣ϕ(t0, x0)∣∣+ ∣∣Dxϕ(t0, x0)∣∣+ ∣∣D2xϕ(t0, x0)∣∣ as set in part (a). It then follows from (4.105) that
H1
(








2 − C0ϕC(κ, x0)− C(κ, x0) > −∞.
Thus ̺ <∞.















H(t, x, y, z,Γ, u′, v). (4.106)
As ϕ ∈ C1,2
(
[0, T ]× Rk
)










∣∣ϕ(t, x)− ϕ(t0, x0)∣∣ ∨ ∣∣∣Dxϕ(t, x) −Dxϕ(t0, x0)∣∣∣ ∨ ∣∣∣D2xϕ(t, x) −D2xϕ(t0, x0)∣∣∣ ≤ 12m ,











































































}Po(ui) ∈ V, ∀u ∈ U
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defines a B(U)/B(V)−measurable function.
Given u∈U, there exists an i∈N such that u∈O(ui)\ ∪
j<i









≤ κ+m[ui]U = κ ≤ κ+m[u]U. (4.109)
On the other hand, if ui 6= u0, then [ui]U ≤ [u]U+ρU(u, ui) ≤ [u]U+λ˜(ui) ≤ [u]U+
1









≤ κ+m[ui]U≤κ+ 2m[u]U. (4.110)

















H(t, x, ϕ(t, x), Dxϕ(t, x), D
2
xϕ(t, x), u,P(u)),







̺ ≥ H(t, x, ϕ(t, x), Dxϕ(t, x), D
2
xϕ(t, x), u,P(u)), ∀ (t, x) ∈ Oδ(t0, x0), ∀u ∈ U. (4.111)


















j∈N be a sequence of O δ6 (t0, x0) such that
lim
j→∞
(tj , xj) = (t0, x0) and lim
j→∞
w1(tj , xj) = w1(t0, x0) = ϕ(t0, x0) = lim
j→∞
ϕ(tj , xj).
So one can find a j ∈ N that ∣∣w1(tj , xj)− ϕ(tj , xj)∣∣ < 5
6
℘˜t0. (4.112)






= P(µs), s ∈ [tj , T ] is a V−valued,



































So β̂(µ)∈Vtj . Let µ
1, µ2 ∈Utj such that µ
1=µ2, ds×dP−a.s. on [[tj , τ [[∪ [[τ, T ]]A for some τ ∈Stj ,T and A∈Fτ .












, ds×dP−a.s. on [[tj , τ [[∪ [[τ, T ]]A. Hence, β̂∈Btj .



















∈ Stj ,T .
As
∣∣(T,XΘµT )− (tj , xj)∣∣≥T−tj≥T−t0−|tj−t0|>δ0− δ6 > 23δ, the continuity of XΘµ implies that P−a.s.








(tj , xj) ⊂ O 5
6 δ
























− ℘˜(τµ∧s), s ∈ [tj , T ] defines a bounded









Zµr dBr, s ∈ [tj , T ], (4.115)



































































































i.e. Zµ ∈ H2,p
F
(

















Let ℓ, θ1 and θ2 still be the continuous functions considered in part (a). Like φ in (4.101),
φ˜(t, x)
△




(ϕ(t, x) − ℘θ2(t, x)), ∀ (t, x) ∈ [tj , T ]× R
k
define a continuous function with φ˜ ≥ w1. Similar to (4.102) and (4.103), we can deduce from (4.114), (4.113),














for ds×dP−a.s. (s, ω)∈
[tj , T ]×Ω. As f
Θµ











, ∀ s ∈ [tj , T ].























Taking essential supremum over µ ∈ Utj and applying Theorem 2.1 with (t, x, δ) = (tj , xj ,
2

















































. A contradiction appears. Therefore, w1 is a viscosity
supersolution of (3.1) with Hamiltonian H1. 
References
[1] R. Atar and A. Budhiraja, A stochastic differential game for the inhomogeneous ∞-Laplace equation, Ann.
Probab., 38 (2010), pp. 498–531.
[2] E. Bayraktar and Y. Huang, On the multi-dimensional controller and stopper games, to appear in SIAM
Journal on Control and Optimization, (2013). Available at http://arxiv.org/abs/1009.0932.
[3] E. Bayraktar, I. Karatzas, and S. Yao, Optimal stopping for dynamic convex risk measures, Illinois
Journal of Mathematics, 54 (2010), pp. 1025–1067.
[4] E. Bayraktar and M. Sˆırbu, Stochastic perron’s method and verification without smoothness using viscosity
comparison: obstacle problems and Dynkin games, to appear in the Proceedings of the American Mathematical
Society, (2012). Available at http://arxiv.org/abs/1112.4904.
References 41
[5] , Stochastic perron’s method for Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations, available at
http://arxiv.org/abs/1212.2170, (2013).
[6] B. Bouchard, L. Moreau, and M. Nutz, Stochastic target games with controlled loss, Technical report,
(2012). Available at http://arxiv.org/abs/1206.6325.
[7] B. Bouchard and N. Touzi, Weak dynamic programming principle for viscosity solutions, SIAM J. Control
Optim., 49 (2011), pp. 948–962.
[8] P. Briand, B. Delyon, Y. Hu, E. Pardoux, and L. Stoica, Lp solutions of backward stochastic differ-
ential equations, Stochastic Process. Appl., 108 (2003), pp. 109–129.
[9] S. Browne, Stochastic differential portfolio games, J. Appl. Probab., 37 (2000), pp. 126–147.
[10] R. Buckdahn, Y. Hu, and J. Li, Stochastic representation for solutions of Isaacs’ type integral-partial
differential equations, Stochastic Process. Appl., 121 (2011), pp. 2715–2750.
[11] R. Buckdahn and J. Li, Stochastic differential games and viscosity solutions of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-
Isaacs equations, SIAM J. Control Optim., 47 (2008), pp. 444–475.
[12] , Probabilistic interpretation for systems of Isaacs equations with two reflecting barriers, NoDEA Nonlin-
ear Differential Equations Appl., 16 (2009), pp. 381–420.
[13] , Stochastic differential games with reflection and related obstacle problems for Isaacs equations, Acta
Math. Appl. Sin. Engl. Ser., 27 (2011), pp. 647–678.
[14] N. El-Karoui and S. Hamade`ne, BSDEs and risk-sensitive control, zero-sum and nonzero-sum game prob-
lems of stochastic functional differential equations, Stochastic Process. Appl., 107 (2003), pp. 145–169.
[15] N. El Karoui, S. Peng, and M. C. Quenez, Backward stochastic differential equations in finance, Math.
Finance, 7 (1997), pp. 1–71.
[16] W. H. Fleming and P. E. Souganidis, On the existence of value functions of two-player, zero-sum stochastic
differential games, Indiana Univ. Math. J., 38 (1989), pp. 293–314.
[17] H. Fo¨llmer and A. Schied, Stochastic finance, vol. 27 of de Gruyter Studies in Mathematics, Walter de
Gruyter & Co., Berlin, extended ed., 2004. An introduction in discrete time.
[18] S. Hamade`ne and J. P. Lepeltier, Zero-sum stochastic differential games and backward equations, Systems
Control Lett., 24 (1995), pp. 259–263.
[19] S. Hamadene, J.-P. Lepeltier, and S. Peng, BSDEs with continuous coefficients and stochastic differential
games, in Backward stochastic differential equations (Paris, 1995–1996), vol. 364 of Pitman Res. Notes Math.
Ser., Longman, Harlow, 1997, pp. 115–128.
[20] N. Ikeda and S. Watanabe, Stochastic differential equations and diffusion processes, vol. 24 of North-
Holland Mathematical Library, North-Holland Publishing Co., Amsterdam, second ed., 1989.
[21] I. Karatzas and S. E. Shreve, Brownian motion and stochastic calculus, vol. 113 of Graduate Texts in
Mathematics, Springer-Verlag, New York, second ed., 1991.
[22] N. V. Krylov, Controlled diffusion processes, vol. 14 of Stochastic Modelling and Applied Probability. Trans-
lated from the 1977 Russian original by A. B. Aries.
[23] , On C1+α regularity of solutions of Isaacs parabolic equations with VMO coefficients, Technical report,
(2012). Available at http://arxiv.org/abs/1211.4882.
[24] , On the existence of smooth solutions for fully nonlinear parabolic equations with measurable “coefficients”
without convexity assumptions, Technical report, (2012). Available at http://arxiv.org/abs/1208.4373.
On Zero-Sum Stochastic Differential Games 42
[25] A. J. Lazarus, D. E. Loeb, J. G. Propp, and D. Ullman, Richman games, in Games of no chance,
vol. 29 of Math. Sci. Res. Inst. Publ., Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1996, pp. 439–449.
[26] J. Neveu, Discrete-parameter martingales, North-Holland Publishing Co., Amsterdam, revised ed., 1975.
Translated from the French by T. P. Speed, North-Holland Mathematical Library, Vol. 10.
[27] E´. Pardoux and S. G. Peng, Adapted solution of a backward stochastic differential equation, Systems
Control Lett., 14 (1990), pp. 55–61.
[28] S. Peng, BSDEs and stochastic optimizations, in Topics in Stochastic Analysis, J. Yan, S. Peng, S. Fang, and
L. Wu, eds., Science Press, Beijing, 1997 (in Chinese).
[29] S. Peng and X. Xu, BSDEs with random default time and related zero-sum stochastic differential games, C.
R. Math. Acad. Sci. Paris, 348 (2010), pp. 193–198.
[30] S. G. Peng, A generalized dynamic programming principle and Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, Stochastics
Stochastics Rep., 38 (1992), pp. 119–134.
[31] Y. Peres, O. Schramm, S. Sheffield, and D. B. Wilson, Tug-of-war and the infinity Laplacian, J.
Amer. Math. Soc., 22 (2009), pp. 167–210.
[32] T. Pham and J. Zhang, Two person zero-sum game in weak formulation and path dependent Bellman-Isaacs
equation, Technical report, (2012). Available at http://arxiv.org/abs/1209.6605.
[33] P. Vito´ria., A weak dynamic programming principle for zero-sum stochastic differential games, Master degree
thesis, Universidade Te´cnica de Lisboa, (2010).
